NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

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MINUTES

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING

Monday, October 7, 1974 Date:

2:55 p.m. to 4:35 p.m. Time:

Place: Cabinet Room, The White House

SALT Subject:

Principals

The President Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger Director of Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Fred Ikle Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General George S. Brown Deputy Director of Central Intelligence General Vernon A. Walters

Other Attendees:

Deputy Secretary Robert Ingersoll State:

Deputy Secretary William Clements Defense:

CIA: Carl Duckett

Mr. Donald Rumsfeld, Assistant to the President White House:

Lt Gen Brent Scowcroft

Jan M. Lodal NSC:

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President Ford: Let me start by mentioning a problem we have concerning the use of classified material. Four or five days ago, I saw a story in the New York Times containing a working paper I used in my discussions with Rabin. This morning, I saw another portion in an article, containing damaging quotes, giving our position, our assessment of Israeli military capability and so forth. I've been told that the New York Times has so much classified material, they don't know where to store it.

This is unforgivable. I have discussed several options for how to deal with it with Don Rumsfeld. I have decided that I would like within 48 hours two things from each of you. First, from Defense, State, and any others involved in this, I would like you to give me a report on what you find the situation to be in your agency and what you can do to stop these leaks. Second, I have told my staff to contact the Attorney General to see what he and the FBI can do. I would also like within 48 hours from each of you what you have done to stop the problem. This is a management problem. When I hear that the New York Times has more classified material than they can use, something has gone wrong.

The FBI has troubles in this area, and I don't know if they can ever be successful in stopping this. Thus, I see it mainly as a management problem in the Departments. A good manager stops it.

The situation is intolerable. The document I saw was one I personally used, about our shopping list with the Israelis -- what the Israelis had, what they wanted, and our analysis.

Secretary Schlesinger: Mr. President, there are two routes you can take on this. We can do our best, but we don't have the tools we need. We need an official secrets act or its equivalent. We are hardput to deal with the press with our present tools. We can use our internal investigators, but that gets into things like polygraphs. The present climate is bad for this sort of thing. Internal morale is such that effective discipline is hard to achieve.

President Ford: Take this one document I saw, and there are perhaps others. It would be interesting to see how many copies of this document there were. We may have to cut down on the number of such documents and make sure we know who has them and be careful on the distribution. In the next 48 hours, I would like your recommendations on how to tighten up this system.

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Secretary Schlesinger: We may have to go to a procedure whereby the final papers, those submitted to you for Presidential decision, are made in only two or three copies. Others can be allowed to see them, but copies would not be distributed.

Deputy Secretary Clements: Was this an NSC document?

Secretary Kissinger: It must have been the working paper developed in the Working Group.

President Ford: It was the paper with the five options I considered.

Secretary Kissinger: This was worked through the SRG. It must have been from these papers.

President Ford: The story I saw gave what Defense said was their appraisal of the Israeli's offensive and defensive capability. It had the various options for Israeli support, ranging from 67 million dollars on up to 500 million dollars. All these have been discussed here -- I remember we had a chart with the options. There must have been a paper floating around with this on it.

Deputy Secretary Clements: That's right. It was the Working Group paper.

President Ford: I've also seen stories about their long range program, where they ask for 1.5 billion dollars for five years.

Secretary Schlesinger: The Israelis have been noisying that around town. They've been talking to Scoop Jackson and Ribicoff about it. There's no secret about the magnitude of their request.

President Ford: No, but there's the question about our appraisal. Scoop and Ribicoff do not have that. Please let me have within 48 hours what you can do internally. I've also talked with the Attorney General. I could have ordered an FBI investigation on this, but Don and I thought it would be better to see what you could do first.

We have some important decisions which have to be reached. We have to give guidance to Henry and our negotiators for use in their contacts with the Soviet Union leading up to a SALT agreement, if one is achievable. I understand that you have had some previous meetings in which you went over various options. Henry, would you like to proceed and explain the options to us?

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