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INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE *AL*

SUBJECT: Your Visit to Moscow

I. **SETTING**

You will visit Moscow for your third meeting, and second "summit," with Boris Yeltsin in nine months. Like all U.S.-Russian and Soviet summits before it, even in the post-Cold War era, the stakes are high. You and Yeltsin will grapple with some tough issues that have brought new challenges to our relationship just in the last few months. Yeltsin is arguably your most important foreign counterpart, and support for reform in Russia remains at the top of your foreign policy priorities -- and an area of great progress -- in your first year in office.

This visit will differ from your previous meetings with Yeltsin in Vancouver and Tokyo in one important respect--it comes at a crossroads in our relationship with Russia **and** at a critical turning point in Russia's own democratic experiment.

In Vancouver, you and Yeltsin succeeded in establishing distinct economic, security and political pillars for a new era of partnership with Russia. You mobilized \$4.5 billion in support of Russia/NIS reform and took the lead in garnering international support for those reforms with the G-7, IMF and World Bank. You gave unflinching political support and legitimacy to Yeltsin during the March, April and October constitutional crises as well as in the aftermath of the December elections. You fashioned with Yeltsin a new era of cooperation in foreign policy and in improving our security and military-to-military ties. The results have been generally positive moves toward partnership, as in the recent Gore-Chernomyrdin agreement to build together an international Space Station.

But this new partnership and the positive direction of our relations with Russia are under fresh scrutiny. Critics in the press and elsewhere charge that we bet too heavily on Yeltsin and reform. They point to aggressive Russian

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cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

behavior toward its neighbors and to the electoral success of Zhirinovskiy and the communists to support their thesis that the Russians will now revert to a more traditional authoritarian and aggressive posture at home and abroad. Specifically, many believe Yeltsin may have to slow the economic reforms in the wake of the elections, and maintain the edge on the nationalists by pursuing a tougher policy in the Baltics, Moldova and with Ukraine -- as well as at the Security Council.

While there are some who believe this to be inevitable, that is not the way we read Yeltsin or his current situation. We think we can continue close cooperation with Russia to advance our many national -- and global -- interests at stake. But this will not be an easy task. It requires persistence, considerable diplomatic skill, and creativity. **Your top priority in Moscow will thus be to reaffirm with Yeltsin the Vancouver framework for a close U.S.-Russia partnership built on a Russian commitment to democratic political and market reform.**

Yeltsin will greet you in Moscow as a man dedicated to reform but burdened by Russia's many problems at the start of its third year of independence. He and the reform movement he leads have just emerged from a bitter and turbulent two-year power struggle with the dying institutions of the old Soviet Union. The past two years have seen several major constitutional crises, the April referendum, and the tragic events of October that nearly cost Yeltsin and reformers their political lives. Against this backdrop, it is a huge achievement that they are still standing at all. It is extraordinary that they were simultaneously able to put in place the essential building blocks of a fledgling democracy and a Russian-style market economy.

The reform "victory" in the first distinct phase of this century's second Russian revolution does not mean that the struggle for power in Russia is over. While the recent elections produced a new post-Soviet constitution and a new parliament, the only thing assured is that Russian politics will remain badly fractured with no clear majority view to guide the future. In the aftermath of the elections, Yeltsin faces stark choices. Russian political and social debate is deeply divided over the pace and direction of economic reform, the role and rights of Russia in the "Near Abroad," and relations with Eastern Europe, the U.S., and the rest of the West. There is substantial ambivalence in Russia about how fast to "integrate" with the West in economics and politics.

Yeltsin enters this new era with several advantages. Despite the difficult past two years, he remains the country's most visible and popular political leader. While the new Parliament will be, in theory, an alternative source of power to him, it will likely be fractured and unfocused

for some time and not sufficiently strong at the start to challenge the basic direction of his policies. The new constitution also provides Yeltsin with strong powers in foreign policy that give him a measure of freedom in dealing with us and the rest of the world. But there can be no doubt that the elections have raised questions at home about his domestic and foreign policies that he will have to answer soon. These issues, combined with continuing concerns about the state of Yeltsin's health, will make 1994 a pivotal year for his country and for our relations with it.

II. CORE GOALS

- o Reaffirm with Yeltsin the foundations of the U.S.-Russian partnership you designed in Vancouver;
- o Emphasize privately to him and publicly in Moscow continuing, strong American support for economic reform and the development of a democratic political system;
- o Reach out to a broader group of Russian leaders to demonstrate our interest in Russia beyond Boris Yeltsin;
- o Seek Yeltsin's agreement to continue the historic process of integrating Russia economically and politically with the West;
- o Pursue specific agreements on four core issues in the relationship: 1) new U.S. ideas to support Russia's economic reforms through more intensive World Bank/IMF and G-7 assistance; 2) Russia's agreement to help build a new security environment in Europe through the Partnership for Peace; 3) Russian reaffirmation of its intention to be a good neighbor and specific progress (in Baltic troop withdrawals) to prove it; and 4) conclusion of a historic agreement with Moscow and Kiev to remove all nuclear weapons from Ukraine.

III. ACHIEVING THESE GOALS

Schedule

You will have a full two-day schedule in Moscow to pursue our objectives for the Summit. The heart of your visit will be four substantive sessions with Yeltsin and other Russian government leaders: a kick-off one-on-one session with Yeltsin in the Kremlin to discuss how to keep our partnership on track; an expanded meeting on economic issues highlighted by discussion of how we can provide the most effective international assistance for Russian reforms and a review of our bilateral efforts; a working dinner at a dacha outside Moscow on foreign policy problems, especially Russian behavior in the "Near Abroad;" and an expanded meeting on security issues where you will, if necessary or

possible, nail down the nuclear deal with Ukraine and discuss nonproliferation issues and arms control.

In addition to these meetings, the possibility exists that you and Yeltsin could meet with Ukrainian President Kravchuk during your visit to conclude a historic agreement to remove all the nuclear weapons from Ukrainian soil.

You will also participate in several events designed to demonstrate our respect for the Russian people and our interest in reaching out to a broader group of reformers and opposition figures. Your brief meeting with the Patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church, Aleksiy II, will send a positive message to the millions of people who are reviving Russia's spiritual life. You will visit a Russian factory to meet workers and give symbolic support to privatization. Your meeting with new Parliamentary leaders and reception with a diverse group of political leaders from throughout Russia will answer those critics who misperceive our policy as a Yeltsin-only embrace. In fact, your schedule has been carefully arranged so that it does not appear to be an exclusive embrace of Yeltsin. One of the most important events will be your speech to the Russian people and a follow-up question and answer session with young Russians at the Ostankino television studio.

SUBSTANCE

As usual, the agenda for the summit is full, involving a number of important security, economic and political issues. Your first substantive objective will be to use the initial one-on-one to focus Yeltsin on the imperative of reaffirming the foundations of the relationship and moving forward together on these core issues. We have designed an approach for you that poses this question directly and asks for his agreement that we will work hard to make progress across the board. This is an important meeting that will set the substantive tone for the entire visit.

Economic issues will dominate the first morning, especially given the criticism in Russia that the reform drive has left average Russians worse off than when the USSR collapsed two years ago. You will want to draw Yeltsin out on his plans for reform in 1994 and determine if he plans any deviation from the course he began in 1992. Your message is twofold: that he should continue a strong reform effort based on a commitment to privatization, macro-economic stabilization and fighting inflation; and that we understand the need for him to provide greater targeted social investments for Russians. If we have made progress with the G-7 in the week preceding your arrival, you will be able to float with him several ideas for more effective western assistance to support this effort. You will need to make clear our inability to design or fully fund

targetted social investments -- that is clearly Russia's job. But we want to help him do so. You will also want to review the effectiveness of U.S. assistance efforts in 1993 and focus Yeltsin on a more ambitious effort to promote greater private trade and investment.

Your working dinner on the first evening will focus on two of the other core four issues: Partnership for Peace, and Russian foreign policy in the "Near Abroad." We are working to insure that Yeltsin says "yes" to the Partnership for Peace proposal that you will bring from the NATO meeting in Brussels. It is important that he understand this is critical to the long-term mission to integrate a modern Russia into the West. It is also critical that he understand that Russia must also be true to important international norms in foreign policy in order to maintain good relations with the U.S. and other countries. You will need to let Yeltsin know squarely that a continuation of aggressive Russian behavior in the Near Abroad risks undercutting the core of his support in the West. You can urge him to take specific steps to make sure this does not happen, such as agreement with Estonia and Latvia on a withdrawal of Russian troops in early 1994.

Finally, the most important of the core four issues will be the centerpiece of your meeting on security issues: our attempt to work with Russia and Ukraine to conclude an agreement that would lead to the withdrawal and dismantlement of all of the strategic nuclear weapons in Ukraine. A successful resolution of this negotiation would be the crowning achievement of the summit, a victory for your nonproliferation policy and would provide a strong public symbol of Russia's willingness to work fairly with its most important neighbor.