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Head By: Susan T. Wickwire x74069

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Environmental and Scientific Affairs

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	ITC-01	L-01	MCO-01	ADS-00	MMP-00	M-00	NEA-01
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/20/02
 TAGS: SENV, KSCA, ENRG, PREL, JA
 SUBJECT: CLIMATE CHANGE: OUTCOMES FROM THE KYOTO
 CONFERENCE

REF: 97 TOKYO 10549

1. CLASSIFIED BY MELINDA L. KIMBLE, ACTING A/S, OES.
 REASON: E.O. 12958, 1.5(D).

2. (U) SUMMARY. THE THIRD CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES (COP-3) TO THE FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE (FCCC) ENDED ON THURSDAY, DECEMBER 11, 1997, NEARLY ONE FULL DAY AFTER ITS SCHEDULED TERMINATION. THE PARTIES AGREED TO THE "KYOTO PROTOCOL," A TREATY THAT WILL REQUIRE U.S. SENATE ADVICE AND CONSENT TO RATIFICATION. WE ANTICIPATE THAT THE PROTOCOL WILL PRODUCE SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTIONS IN GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS IN DEVELOPED COUNTRIES AND ULTIMATELY HARNESS THE FORCES OF THE GLOBAL MARKETPLACE TO PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT. WHILE THE U.S. SUCCEEDED IN ENSURING THAT THE AGREEMENT INCLUDED MANY OF OUR PROPOSALS, WE WERE UNABLE TO OVERCOME SIGNIFICANT OPPOSITION TO INCLUDING EXPLICIT PROVISIONS FOR BINDING DEVELOPING COUNTRY COMMITMENTS. THIS CABLE BUILDS UPON THE

UPDATE PROVIDED IN REFTEL AND REVIEWS THE OUTCOMES OF THE MEETING. IT IS ALSO INTENDED TO INFORM POSTS ON THE BEHAVIOR OF HOST GOVERNMENTS AT THE CONFERENCE. AN UNCLASSIFIED ASSESSMENT OF THE MEETING AND A SET OF TALKING POINTS TO BE USED IN PUBLIC SETTINGS WILL FOLLOW SEPTEL. END SUMMARY.

LEAD-UP TO THE FINALE

3. (SBU) A WEEK-LONG, SLOWLY MATURING NEGOTIATING PROCESS WAS RE-IGNITED BY THE DECEMBER 8 VISIT OF VICE PRESIDENT GORE. IN HIS SPEECH AT THE COP PLENARY, HE STRESSED THAT

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LEGISLATIVE BINDING EMISSIONS LIMITS WOULD CREATE NEW MARKETS FOR TECHNOLOGIES TO ADDRESS THE CLIMATE CHANGE PROBLEM. REITERATED THE U.S. COMMITMENT TO REDUCE EMISSIONS BY NEARLY 30 PERCENT OF PROJECTED LEVELS BY 2010; THAT THE AGREEMENT MUST BE STRONG AND COMPREHENSIVE WITH COVERAGE OF ALL SIX MAJOR GREENHOUSE GASES AND INCLUSION OF SINKS; THAT THE AGREEMENT PROVIDE FOR EMISSIONS TRADING AND IMPLEMENTATION; AND THAT IT HAVE STRICT MONITORING AND ACCOUNTABILITY. THE VICE PRESIDENT ALSO ANNOUNCED INCREASED FLEXIBILITY ON THE PART OF THE U.S. NEGOTIATORS IF "A COMPREHENSIVE PLAN [WERE TO BE] PUT IN PLACE, ONE WITH REALISTIC TARGETS AND TIMETABLES, MARKET MECHANISMS, AND THE MEANINGFUL PARTICIPATION OF KEY DEVELOPING COUNTRIES." THIS LAST STATEMENT WAS WELCOMED BY MANY IN THE PLENARY AS A SIGN OF U.S. SERIOUSNESS IN ACHIEVING AN AGREEMENT.

4. (C) A FLURRY OF HIGH-LEVEL BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS WITH THE EU, JUSCANZ (NON-EU OECD MEMBERS SUCH AS JAPAN, CANADA, AND AUSTRALIA), AND CRITICAL DEVELOPING COUNTRIES BEGAN SUNDAY EVENING, DECEMBER 8, WITH THE ARRIVAL OF U/S STUART EIZENSTAT, CHIEF NEGOTIATOR FOR USDEL, AND CONTINUED OVER THE FOLLOWING DAYS. THE VICE PRESIDENT ALSO MET WITH KEY PLAYERS. U/S EIZENSTAT HELD A MARATHON MEETING UNTIL 3:00 A.M. ON DECEMBER 9 WITH THE EU AND JAPAN IN AN EFFORT TO REACH COMMON GROUND ON A RANGE OF ISSUES INCLUDING THE LEVEL OF THE TARGET, GASES, SINKS, FLEXIBILITY MEASURES, "ARTICLE 10" (THE VOLUNTARY OPT-IN FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES), THE CLEAN DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM PROPOSED BY BRAZIL, AND ON DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. A SEPARATE PRE-MEETING WITH JAPAN LED TO A JOINT STRATEGY ON MOST OF THESE

ISSUES. THE EU INITIALLY REACTED WITH SURPRISE AND LEFT FOR ONE HOUR FOR CONSULTATIONS. THE EU MINISTERS PRESENT (PRESCOTT AND MEACHER FROM THE U.K., DEBOER FROM THE NETHERLANDS, LAHURE FROM LUXEMBOURG, AND RITT BJERREGARD FROM THE EC'S DG-XI) SHOWED A LITTLE FLEXIBILITY BUT DID NOT WANT TO DISCUSS FURTHER AREAS OF COMPROMISE UNTIL THEY HAD CONSULTED THEIR COLLEAGUES AND AN "EXPERTS" GROUP HAD MET.

ISSUE-BY-ISSUE ANALYSIS OF THE "KYOTO PROTOCOL"

5. (C) AFTER AN ALL-NIGHT NEGOTIATING SESSION UNDER THE SKILLFUL LEADERSHIP OF ARGENTINE RAUL ESTRADA, CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE, THE PARTIES SUCCEEDED IN REACHING AGREEMENT ON A "KYOTO PROTOCOL" THAT INCORPORATED MANY U.S. PROPOSALS. WHILE THE AGREEMENT DOES NOT HAVE AN EXPLICIT PROVISION THAT WOULD HAVE ENABLED ADVANCED DEVELOPING COUNTRIES TO VOLUNTARILY TAKE ON BINDING EMISSION COMMITMENTS, THEY MAY STILL PARTICIPATE IN EMISSIONS TRADING PROVIDED THAT THEY TAKE ON A TARGET UNDER ANNEX B (LIST OF QUANTIFIED EMISSION LIMITATION AND REDUCTION OBJECTIVES). THE FOLLOWING IS A DESCRIPTION OF THE OUTCOMES FOR PARTICULAR ISSUES IN THE PROTOCOL.

LEVEL OF TARGETS: THE U.S. ANNOUNCEMENT AT KYOTO THAT IT WAS WILLING TO CONSIDER DIFFERENTIATED TARGETS WAS EMBRACED BY THE NON-EUROPEAN UNION COUNTRIES (INCLUDING JAPAN, CANADA, AND AUSTRALIA) AND ULTIMATELY PAVED THE WAY FOR AGREEMENT AMONG THE DEVELOPED COUNTRIES ON LEGALLY BINDING TARGETS. THE EU AGREED TO AN 8 PERCENT REDUCTION, THE U.S. 7 PERCENT, AND JAPAN 6 PERCENT, WITH AN OVERALL REDUCTION OF APPROXIMATELY 5.2 PERCENT BELOW 1990 LEVELS FOR DEVELOPED COUNTRIES. THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, UKRAINE, AND NEW ZEALAND, IN PART DUE TO LACK OF FULL AGREEMENT ON

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EMISSIONS TRADING, AGREED ONLY TO STABILIZE EMISSIONS AT 1990 LEVELS (DOWN FROM ITS INITIAL 18 PERCENT ABOVE ESTIMATE), WHILE ICELAND HAD THE HIGHEST LEVEL AMONG ANNEX I PARTIES WITH A TEN PERCENT INCREASE, REFLECTING ITS UNIQUE SITUATION.

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STRUCTURE OF THE TARGET: LARGELY BASED ON U.S. PROPOSALS, IT INCLUDES ALL SIX MAJOR GREENHOUSE GASES, AS A BASKET

(THE EU AND JAPAN HAD INSISTED ON ONLY THREE); THE "COMMITMENT" PERIOD IS A MULTI-YEAR PERIOD, RATHER THAN A SINGLE YEAR; THE TIMING OF THE "COMMITMENT" PERIOD REFLECTS THE U.S.-JAPANESE PREFERENCE OF 2008-2012 (THE EU PERIOD WAS 2005-2009), WHICH WILL GIVE THE U.S. ADEQUATE TIME TO MEET THE TARGET; AND COUNTRIES MAY USE CERTAIN REMOVALS BY SINKS (SUCH AS THROUGH REFORESTATION) TO MEET THEIR EMISSIONS COMMITMENTS. THE TREATMENT OF SINKS AND GASES WILL ENABLE THE U.S. TO ACHIEVE A SIGNIFICANT PART OF ITS 7 PERCENT REDUCTION. THUS, THE LEVEL OF ACTUAL EFFORT REQUIRED OF THE U.S. IS CLOSE TO THE ORIGINAL STABILIZATION LEVEL.

POLICIES AND MEASURES: WE SUCCESSFULLY DEFEATED THE EU PROPOSAL TO REQUIRE EACH DEVELOPED COUNTRY, IN IMPLEMENTING ITS TARGET, TO TAKE SPECIFIED, MANDATORY MEASURES.

EMISSIONS TRADING: AS ONE OF THE TWO MAIN ELEMENTS OF FLEXIBILITY ADVOCATED BY THE U.S., THE INCLUSION OF EMISSIONS TRADING AMONG COUNTRIES WITH TARGETS, ALONG WITH JOINT IMPLEMENTATION, WAS A CRITICAL FACTOR IN AGREEING TO A MORE STRINGENT EMISSIONS TARGET. THE PRINCIPLE OF EMISSIONS TRADING SURVIVED HEATED OPPOSITION LED BY INDIA, CHINA AND UNEXPECTEDLY, THE EUROPEAN UNION. STRONG SUPPORT FROM AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND, CANADA, RUSSIA, UKRAINE AND EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES HELPED FORGE A WORKABLE AGREEMENT ON THIS ISSUE, TOGETHER WITH A LAST-MINUTE COMPROMISE DISCUSSED DURING A RECESS BY U/S EIZENSTAT AND CHAIRMAN ESTRADA. (THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION AND UKRAINE GAVE UP THEIR DEMAND THAT THEY RECEIVE CREDIT FOR ALL THEIR REDUCTIONS BACK TO 1990.) THE TRADING CONCEPT WILL BE MADE OPERATIONAL BY A SET OF RULES AND GUIDELINES TO BE DECIDED BY THE NEXT CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES IN NOVEMBER, 1998 (COP-4) IN BUENOS AIRES.

JOINT IMPLEMENTATION/CLEAN DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM: COUNTRIES WITH TARGETS MAY ENGAGE IN JOINT IMPLEMENTATION WITHOUT THE NEED FOR FURTHER RULES TO BE DECIDED. COUNTRIES WITH TARGETS MAY ALSO GET CREDIT (INCLUDING THROUGH THEIR PRIVATE SECTORS) FOR PROJECTS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES THROUGH A SO-CALLED "CLEAN DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM." THE NORTH-SOUTH OWNERSHIP OF THIS CONCEPT, ACHIEVED THROUGH OUR ACTIVE PARTNERSHIP WITH BRAZIL, ESTABLISHES A SOLID FOUNDATION FOR ITS SUCCESS. THE CONCEPT WAS SUPPORTED BY THE ALLIANCE OF SMALL ISLAND

STATES (AOSIS), INDONESIA, MEXICO, EGYPT, PAKISTAN, COSTA RICA, AND SOUTH AFRICA. THE RULES FOR THIS MECHANISM ALSO WILL REQUIRE FURTHER ELABORATION AT COP-4. CHINA, WHICH INITIALLY OPPOSED THE CONCEPT, WAS BROUGHT AROUND BY BRAZIL BUT DID NOT ARTICULATE ITS POSITION ON THE FLOOR.

DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: ALTHOUGH THE PROTOCOL WILL ENGAGE SOME DEVELOPING COUNTRY PARTICIPATION THROUGH THE CLEAN DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM, OUR GREATEST DISAPPOINTMENT WAS THE DEFEAT OF AN EXPLICIT PROVISION WHICH WOULD HAVE ALLOWED DEVELOPING COUNTRIES TO VOLUNTARILY TAKE ON BINDING EMISSIONS LIMITS AND PARTICIPATE IN EMISSIONS TRADING WITH

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DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. DESPITE SUPPORT FROM CHINA, ARGENTINA, COSTA RICA, SOUTH AFRICA AND ISRAEL, THE STRIDENT OPPOSITION OF CHINA, INDIA AND OTHERS CARRIED THE DAY. MEXICO AND KOREA FAVORED EMISSIONS TRADING BUT WOULD ONLY ENDORSE VOLUNTARY EMISSIONS LIMITS FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (NOTE: IN FACT, AT ONE POINT DURING A SIDE DISCUSSION, KOREA URGED THE CHAIR TO DELETE THE OPT-IN PROVISION. A USDEL MEMBER MADE CLEAR TO THE KOREAN DELEGATE THAT WE FOUND SUCH BEHAVIOR DISTURBING. END NOTE) AS MENTIONED ABOVE, THERE IS AN INDIRECT FALLBACK IN THE EMISSIONS TRADING PROVISION WHICH COULD ALLOW DEVELOPING COUNTRIES TO PARTICIPATE IN EMISSIONS TRADING PROVIDED THAT THEY TAKE ON A TARGET UNDER ANNEX B. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A FOLLOW-ON PROCESS UNDER WHICH KEY DEVELOPING COUNTRIES WOULD COMMIT TO LEGALLY BINDING TARGETS WILL BECOME ONE OF THE HIGHEST PRIORITIES FOR COP-4.

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NATIONAL SECURITY EXEMPTION: IN THE FORM OF A DECISION OF THE PARTIES, DOD'S THREE OBJECTIVES WERE ACHIEVED: EXEMPTING EMISSIONS FROM BUNKER FUELS; EXEMPTING EMISSIONS RESULTING FROM MULTILATERAL OPERATIONS PURSUANT TO THE UN CHARTER; AND EXPLICITLY PERMITTING COUNTRIES TO DECIDE HOW TO ACCOUNT, AMONG THEMSELVES, FOR EMISSIONS RELATING TO MULTILATERAL OPERATIONS (WHICH, FOR EXAMPLE, WOULD ALLOW THE U.S. AND GERMANY TO AGREE THAT THE U.S. WOULD COUNT EMISSIONS RELATED TO U.S. TRAINING IN GERMANY). THIS WAS A MAJOR VICTORY.

"COMPENSATION": THE OPEC PROPOSAL FOR A COMPENSATION FUND UNDER WHICH DEVELOPED COUNTRIES WOULD COMPENSATE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES FOR INCOME LOSSES SUFFERED DUE TO ACTIONS TO MITIGATE CLIMATE CHANGE WAS DEFEATED. POLAND PROVED A KEY ALLY ON THIS ISSUE. UNFORTUNATELY, THE ISSUE IS NOT

COMPLETELY DEAD; RATHER, THE PARTIES AT COP-4 ARE TO CONSIDER WHAT ACTIONS MIGHT BE NECESSARY TO MINIMIZE THE ADVERSE EFFECTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE AND/OR THE IMPACTS OF RESPONSE MEASURES ON DEVELOPING COUNTRIES.

U.S. /RUSSIAN FEDERATION/CANADA/JAPAN/AUSTRALIA/PLUS OTHERS UMBRELLA: THE CONCEPT OF A NON-EU "BUBBLE" WAS FORMULATED AT KYOTO NEAR THE END OF THE SESSION AS A WAY TO FACILITATE EMISSIONS TRADING. UKRAINE, NORWAY AND ICELAND ALSO EXPRESSED INTEREST IN PARTICIPATING. IT WAS USED BOTH FOR LEVERAGE AGAINST THE EU AND AS A POTENTIAL WAY TO REDUCE U.S. COSTS AND GAIN PREFERENTIAL ACCESS TO ANTICIPATED LOW COST REDUCTIONS IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION AND UKRAINE. MUCH WORK REMAINS TO BE DONE, BUT THERE WAS AN AGREEMENT TO PURSUE THIS CONCEPT.

COMPLIANCE/ENFORCEMENT: THE U.S. HAD URGED THAT THE PROTOCOL SPECIFY AUTOMATIC CONSEQUENCES FOR EXCEEDING AN EMISSIONS COMMITMENT, NAMELY THAT THE NUMBER OF EXCESS TONS BE SUBTRACTED FROM THE VIOLATING PARTY'S FUTURE ALLOWANCE. THIS PROPOSAL DID NOT SUCCEED, AND NON-COMPLIANCE ISSUES WERE PUT OFF FOR FUTURE DISCUSSION.

ENTRY INTO FORCE: OUR DUAL OBJECTIVE OF SEEKING AN ENTRY INTO FORCE TRIGGER THAT WOULD NOT REQUIRE U.S. RATIFICATION BUT WOULD REQUIRE A CERTAIN LEVEL OF DEVELOPING COUNTRY PARTICIPATION WAS MET. TO TAKE EFFECT, THE PROTOCOL MUST BE RATIFIED BY 55 COUNTRIES, WHICH MUST INCLUDE AT LEAST 55 PERCENT OF THE TOTAL CARBON DIOXIDE EMISSIONS OF DEVELOPED COUNTRIES IN 1990.

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(C) WE MADE SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS IN THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS ON MANY KEY ISSUES OF IMPORTANCE TO THE UNITED STATES. NEARLY ALL OF OUR GOALS WERE ADVANCED TO SOME DEGREE. THE FACT OF KYOTO IS THIS: THE ISSUE OF CLIMATE CHANGE IS NOW WIDELY RECOGNIZED AS A FRONT-BURNER ISSUE FOR THE 21ST CENTURY. ALTHOUGH WE WERE NOT ABLE TO SECURE DEVELOPING COUNTRY COMMITMENTS IN KYOTO, THE SERIOUS, AMBITIOUS COMMITMENTS MADE BY DEVELOPED COUNTRIES PLACES THE U.S. IN A MUCH BETTER POSITION TO WORK WITH DEVELOPING COUNTRIES TO FORMULATE THE NECESSARY MECHANISMS THROUGH WHICH KEY DEVELOPING COUNTRIES CAN MEANINGFULLY PARTICIPATE IN THE AGREEMENT. IN EFFECT, WE HAVE THE FRAMEWORK FOR ACTION WITH MUCH WORK STILL TO DO.

7. (C) IN TERMS OF WORKING WITH OTHER NATIONS TO ACHIEVE THE PROTOCOL, WE SUCCEEDED IN FRACTURING THE G-77 AND CHINA GROUP ALONG REGIONAL AND COMMON INTEREST LINES. THE AOSIS COUNTRIES AS WELL AS SIGNIFICANT PLAYERS IN LATIN AMERICA (INCLUDING MEXICO, ARGENTINA AND CHILE) BROKE RANKS TO SUPPORT THE U.S. POSITION ON INCLUSION OF AN OPT-IN MECHANISM FOR ADVANCED DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND EMISSIONS TRADING. WE ALSO WELCOMED THE PRODUCTIVE RELATIONSHIP WITH BRAZIL WHICH LED TO THE CREATION OF THE CLEAN DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM, ALTHOUGH BRAZIL HELPED LEAD THE FIGHT TO DELETE THE OPT-IN PROVISION. WE ANTICIPATED DIFFICULTIES FROM CHINA, INDIA AND OPEC MEMBERS ON MOST FRONTS. THE VIGOR OF THEIR ATTACKS EXCEEDED OUR EXPECTATIONS AND THEIR SUCCESS IN TAINTING EMISSIONS TRADING WAS DISAPPOINTING.

8. (C) HOWEVER, WE WERE SURPRISED AT THE BEHAVIOR OF THE EUROPEAN UNION. WHILE WE HAVE HAD OUR DIFFERENCES OVER THE COURSE OF THE TWO YEARS OF NEGOTIATIONS, WE HAD WORKED DILIGENTLY TO BRIDGE THE GAPS IN OUR POSITIONS THROUGH HIGH LEVEL BILATERALS AND WORKING LEVEL VIDEO CONFERENCES WITH SOME SUCCESS. THE FACTIONS WITHIN THE EU MADE IT DIFFICULT TO NEGOTIATE WITH THEM IN THE CLOSING STAGES, AND THEIR LAST-MINUTE BACKPEDALING ON EMISSIONS TRADING WAS AN UNWELCOME DEVELOPMENT. IN OUR ESTIMATION, THERE WERE THREE MAJOR CAMPS. THE U.K., LUXEMBOURG, AND THE NETHERLANDS APPEARED GENUINELY TO WANT A WIDELY ACCEPTABLE DEAL AND WERE SUPPORTED IN THIS EFFORT BY ITALY AND, SURPRISINGLY, BY DENMARK. WE UNDERSTAND THAT U.K. DEPUTY PM PRESCOTT, IN PARTICULAR, WORKED WITHIN THE EU TO GAIN SUPPORT FOR COMPROMISE POSITIONS. A SECOND GROUP, LED BY GERMANY AND FRANCE (AND INCLUDING AUSTRIA AND PORTUGAL), WERE CRITICAL OF THE U.S. AND TOOK HARDLINE POSITIONS, INSISTING UPON THE EU WAY OR NO WAY. A THIRD GROUP, INCLUDING SPAIN, FINLAND AND SWEDEN, DID NOT APPEAR TO ACTIVELY PARTICIPATE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS.

9. (C) DESPITE BEING GRANTED THE RIGHT TO "BUBBLE" ITS EMISSIONS, AS A WHOLE, THE EU MADE LITTLE EFFORT TO ACCOMMODATE OTHER PARTIES' CONCERNS AND AGREED TO AN 8 PERCENT REDUCTION RATHER THAN 15 PERCENT, ONCE SINKS AND ALL SIX GASES WERE INCLUDED. ONE SPECIFIC EXAMPLE OF THIS

LACK OF COOPERATION CONCERNED THE DEBATE ON EMISSIONS TRADING. ALTHOUGH WE BELIEVED THAT WE HAD AN UNDERSTANDING, THE U.K., SPEAKING ON BEHALF OF THE EU, INTRODUCED LANGUAGE TO MAKE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF EMISSIONS TRADING CONTINGENT UPON THE EXAMINATION OF THE ENTITLEMENTS, RULES AND ACCOUNTABILITY OF SUCH AN INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM. THAT STATEMENT OPENED THE DOOR FOR NUMEROUS DEVELOPING COUNTRIES TO TAKE THEIR SHOTS AT THE SYSTEM, BUILDING UPON THE U.K. "SUGGESTION." LATER IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, FRANCE HELD UP THE PROCEEDINGS BY QUESTIONING

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THE PRINCIPLES OF THE CLEAN DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM, *Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs*
WHICH HAD ALREADY BEEN ADOPTED, THIS
ENCOURAGED COMMENTS FROM OTHERS THAT LED TO THE CALL FOR A
STUDY OF THE MECHANISM'S IMPLICATIONS WHICH SERVED TO MUDDY
THE WATERS.
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10. (C) THE PROTOCOL OPENS FOR SIGNATURE IN MARCH. WE WILL NOW TURN OUR ATTENTION TO DEVELOPING A DIPLOMATIC GAME PLAN, PARTICULARLY WITH RESPECT TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, IN PREPARATION FOR THE FOURTH CONFERENCE OF PARTIES IN BUENOS AIRES IN NOVEMBER, 1998. IN ADDITION, WE WILL BE WORKING TO HIGHLIGHT FOR THE AMERICAN PEOPLE THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE ACHIEVEMENTS WE HAVE MADE IN KYOTO. WE BELIEVE IT IS CRUCIAL TO THE SUBMISSION FOR RATIFICATION - IF NOT SIGNATURE ITSELF - TO BOTH A SATISFACTORY EMISSIONS TRADING SYSTEM (WHICH THE EU AND THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES WILL CONTINUE TO TRY TO RESTRICT) AND "MEANINGFUL PARTICIPATION" BY KEY DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. THE FORMER IS ESSENTIAL TO MAKE OUR COMMITMENTS AFFORDABLE, THE LATTER TO HAVE ANY CHANCE OF WINNING SENATE RATIFICATION.
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