

~~SECRET~~ (TOP SECRET ATTACHMENTS)

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : RA - Mr. Timmons

DATE: May 19, 1958

FROM : RA - R. A. Fearey *RAF*

DECLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: Macmillan Letter

EO 12350, Sec. 3.3

UNCLAS 931029
EX-105, NARA, Date 6-6-88

*incl copy of
letter from
my desk this
week. Will
it be A.M.*

Attached is the Macmillan letter file. In view of the number of Top Secrets, we have not signed them over to you. If you will send the whole package to me I will see that they get back to the people who have signed them over to me. The most important papers are the Macmillan letter at the top of the file and the record of the Murphy-Caccia conversation of May 14 at the bottom. I am trying to obtain a copy of the aide memoire left by Caccia, and hope to be able to attach it after this is typed.

It has helped me in my own thinking on this decision procedures question to break the thing down into four possible cases:

- (a) Soviet missile and aircraft-delivered nuclear bombs have landed on U.S. or U.K. territories;--in this case the U.S. and U.K. would instantly inform each other of the event but there would be no need for consultation prior to launching nuclear retaliation--it would simply be launched as fast as possible.
- (b) Soviet bombers or missiles are picked up on radar screens approaching U.S. or U.K. territories;--in this case there might be time for consultation on the question whether the attack was a real one and whether U.S. and U.K. retaliatory missiles should be launched (strategic aircraft would certainly be launched on a contingency basis) before a large proportion of our retaliatory capability had been liquidated by the incoming missiles and aircraft.
- (c) The Soviets launch an exclusively conventional attack against Free World forces;--in this case there should be time for consultation on the use of nuclear defensive, and possibly retaliatory weapons.
- (d) The U.S. or U.K. come into possession of intelligence indicating that a Soviet attack is impending;--in this instance too there should be time for consultation.

In view of the limited scope of the discussions proposed by the U.K., restricted solely to retaliatory forces in the U.K., case (c) above would not be involved.

EUR/RA:RAFearey:cnc

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157

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