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Case Number:

PTQ8803

RELEASED IN PART  
B1, 1.5(D), B6

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ACTION SA-01

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 FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD  
 TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0877  
 INFO AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI  
 AMEMBASSY LONDON  
 USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL  
 AMEMBASSY ROME  
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 AMEMBASSY RIYADH  
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 USMISSION USUN NEW YORK  
 AMCONSUL KARACHI  
 AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
 AMCONSUL JEDDAH  
 AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ISLAMABAD 001792

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
REVIEW AUTHORITY: SHARON E AHMAD  
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ROME FOR POL:HARE

USIA FOR NEA:OBEE

CENTCOM ALSO FOR POLAD

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: KISL, MOPS, SNAR, PINS; UN, SA, PK, AF

SUBJECT: FINALLY, A TALKATIVE TALIB: ORIGINS AND MEMBERSHIP  
- OF THE RELIGIOUS STUDENTS' MOVEMENT

1. CONFIDENTIAL -- ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: A TALIBAN INSIDER SAYS THE MOVEMENT IS NOT SUPPORTED BY FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS, BUT DOES HAVE CONNECTIONS TO PASHTUNS IN PAKISTAN AND, VIA MADRASAS, CONSERVATIVE PAKISTANI RELIGIOUS PARTIES. THE TALIBAN, HE SAYS, DO NOT WISH TO INTERFERE WITH THE SHI'A AND WILL PROTECT THE RIGHTS OF ETHNIC MINORITIES. THE RELIGIOUS STUDENTS DO NOT APPEAR AVERSE TO ELECTIONS, BUT ONLY IN THE CONTEXT OF AN ISLAMIC GOVERNMENT RULING THROUGH SHARIAH LAW. ONCE THERE IS GREATER STABILITY IN AFGHANISTAN AND REFUGEES HAVE BEEN REPATRIATED, A NATIONAL SHURA AND PROVINCIAL SHURAS COULD BE ELECTED, WITH THE TALIBAN SHURA DETERMINING WHO COULD RUN FOR OFFICE. THE TALIBAN DESIRE GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE U.S. AND THE U.N., WHICH THEY PERCEIVE AS UNBIASED, BUT DOUBT THE MOTIVATIONS OF SAUDI ARABIA AND THE PAKISTANI GOVERNMENT. END SUMMARY.

MEETING CONFIDENTIAL  
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1. POLOFF WAS CONTACTED FEBRUARY 16 BY [REDACTED]

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WHO CLAIMED TO HAVE A GOOD FRIEND AMONG THE SENIOR LEADERSHIP OF THE TALIBAN. [REDACTED] WHO SAID HE LIVED "JUST ACROSS THE

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BORDER" FROM THE TALIBAN OFFICIAL, [REDACTED] NOTED THAT [REDACTED] WAS VISITING ISLAMABAD, AND SUGGESTED A MEETING. [REDACTED] ADDED THAT [REDACTED] WAS TIPPED TO BECOME A "SENIOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OFFICIAL" FOR THE TALIBAN, AND WAS IN ISLAMABAD FOR INTRODUCTORY AND LOW-KEY CONTACTS WITH THE U.N. AND OTHER "FRIENDLY ELEMENTS" AND VERY MUCH DESIRED TO MEET REPRESENTATIVES OF THE U.S.

B1, B6

B1, B6

4. POLOFF MET WITH [REDACTED] AND [REDACTED] FEBRUARY 17. ALTHOUGH [REDACTED] SPOKE SOME ENGLISH, FOR MOST OF THE CONVERSATION HE RELIED ON [REDACTED] TO TRANSLATE HIS PASHTO. [REDACTED] BEGAN THE CONVERSATION BY ASKING THAT THE MEETING BE KEPT CONFIDENTIAL. HE NOTED THAT PRESS REPORTS WERE SUGGESTING ERRONEOUSLY THAT THE TALIBAN WERE SUBJECT TO FOREIGN INFLUENCE AND THAT THESE ALLEGATIONS COULD HAVE A NEGATIVE IMPACT ON THE TALIBAN'S EFFORTS TO BRING PEACE TO AFGHANISTAN. THE TALIBAN LEADERSHIP HAD ISSUED STRICT INSTRUCTIONS THAT MEETINGS WITH FOREIGN REPRESENTATIVES -- WHICH EASILY COULD BE MISCONSTRUED AND PLAYED UP BY THE TALIBAN'S ENEMIES -- SHOULD BE AVOIDED, [REDACTED] SAID. HOWEVER, SINCE THE UNITED STATES WAS AN IMPORTANT AND UNBIASED FRIEND, [REDACTED] SAID HE HAD DECIDED TO MAKE INITIAL CONTACT.

B1, B6

ORIGINS OF THE TALIBAN  
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5. [REDACTED] OUTLINED FOR POLOFF THE ORIGINS OF THE TALIBAN CONFIDENTIAL.

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MOVEMENT. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] AND A RESIDENT OF THE MAROOF DISTRICT OF KANDAHAR, [REDACTED] SAID HE HAD BEEN IN AN EXCELLENT POSITION TO OBSERVE THE RISE OF THE TALIBAN. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] AND WHILE [REDACTED] ADMITTED THAT HE WAS NOT AN ORIGINAL MEMBER OF THE TALIBAN, HE CLAIMED TO BE VERY FAMILIAR WITH ALL THE MAJOR PLAYERS.

6. [REDACTED] SAID THE TALIBAN BEGAN IN THE MEIWAND DISTRICT

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OF KANDAHAR, AT THE MADRASA OF A PROMINENT TRADER, HAJI BASHAR. HAJI BASHAR HAD BEEN A HIZB-I-ISLAMI (KHALIS) COMMANDER DURING THE JEHAD, AND ONE OF HIS SOLDIERS WAS A POOR MAN NAMED MOHAMMED OMAR FROM THE SMALL HOTAK SUB-CLAN (DESCENDED FROM THE MIRWAIS HOTAK WHO BRIEFLY RULED AFGHANISTAN BEFORE AHMED SHAH DURRANI). OMAR'S CLAN WAS SMALL AND UNDISTINGUISHED, OCCUPYING ONLY ONE HOUSE IN MEIWAND. OMAR HIMSELF HAD RECEIVED AN ISLAMIC EDUCATION "ON A SMALL SCALE," ONLY BARELY ACHIEVING THE LEVEL OF MAULAVI. MULLAH OMAR HAD EARNED A REPUTATION FOR BRAVERY AND SOLDIERING DURING THE

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NSAE-00 OIC-02 PM-00 P-01 SNIS-00 NISC-01 PMB-00  
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FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0878  
INFO AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL  
AMEMBASSY ROME  
AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT  
USIA WASHDC 3137  
AMEMBASSY RIYADH  
AMCONSUL PESHAWAR  
AMEMBASSY TASHKENT  
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JEHAD, LOSING AN EYE IN THE PROCESS, AND AFTER THE WAR HAD  
RETURNED TO THE MADRASA FUNDED BY HAJI BASHAR. THERE OMAR'S  
REPUTATION FOR HONESTY AND SINCERITY GREW -- DESPITE HIS BEING  
NEITHER PARTICULARLY CHARISMATIC NOR ARTICULATE.

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7. DURING THE SUMMER OF 1994, THE SITUATION IN KANDHAR CITY HAD BECOME VERY BAD, [REDACTED] RELATED, REACHING A NEW LOW WHEN SEVERAL MADRASA STUDENTS WERE GANG-RAPED BY A LOCAL COMMANDER. AT ABOUT THIS TIME, MULLAH OMAR WENT TO HAJI BASHAR AND RELATED A VISION IN WHICH THE PROPHET MOHAMMED HAD APPEARED TO HIM AND TOLD HIM OF THE NEED TO BRING PEACE TO AFGHANISTAN. HAJI BASHAR BELIEVED MULLAH OMAR, AND DRAWING UPON FAMILY RESOURCES AND LOCAL BUSINESS AND POLITICAL CONNECTIONS (INCLUDING THE BAZAARIS AND JAMIAT COMMANDER MULLAH NAQIBULLAH), RAISED 8 MILLION PAKISTANI RUPEES (USD 250,000) FOR THE CAUSE AND CONTRIBUTED SIX PICK-UP TRUCKS. ARMS AND AMMUNITION CAME INITIALLY FROM STOCKS LEFT OVER FROM THE JEHAD.

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EARLY MILITARY ACTION  
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8. THE MOVEMENT SOON HAD ABOUT 200 ADHERENTS AND TOOK OVER THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE MEIWAND DISTRICT, [REDACTED] CLAIMED. THE SEIZURE OF THE IMPORTANT TOWN OF BOLDAK SOON FOLLOWED, MOTIVATED BY STORIES OF "VERY BAD AND UNISLAMIC BEHAVIOR" BY THE HEKMATYAR COMMANDER THERE -- AND WITH THE CAPTURE OF THE TOWN CAME ACCESS TO THE LARGE AMOUNT OF MILITARY SUPPLIES AT THE SPIN BOLDAK ARMORY. [REDACTED] DENIED THE REPORT THAT THE TALIBAN WERE SUPPORTED IN SEIZING THE ARMORY BY PAKISTANI INTERIOR MINISTER BABAR'S FRONTIER CORPS. HE NOTED THAT BABAR HAD NOT EVEN CONSULTED WITH THE FLEDGLING TALIBAN MOVEMENT WHEN PLANNING THE GOP'S CENTRAL ASIAN CONVOY, PREFERRING TO DEAL WITH MORE ESTABLISHED KANDAHARI COMMANDERS.

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9. [REDACTED] OBSERVED THAT PAKISTAN HAD BEGUN TO PAY ATTENTION TO THE TALIBAN WHEN THE GROUP STOPPED THE CENTRAL ASIAN CONVOY AT BOLDAK. THE TALIBAN HAD OBJECTED TO PAKISTAN'S "HIGH-HANDEDNESS" IN NOT NOTIFYING AFGHAN AUTHORITIES IN KABUL ABOUT THE CONVOY, [REDACTED] NOTED. HOWEVER, AFTER HOLDING THE CONVOY FOR SEVERAL DAYS, THE TALIBAN HAD BEEN CONVINCED BY THE SENIOR PAKISTANI ESCORT, [REDACTED] THAT

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THE CONVOY WAS GOOD "FOR MUSLIMS." [REDACTED] SAID THE TALIBAN HAD BEEN PERSUADED BY [REDACTED] ARGUMENT THAT PAKISTAN WAS A MUSLIM COUNTRY AND THAT THERE WAS ALSO A BROADER ISLAMIC DUTY TO ASSIST THE MUSLIM BROTHERS IN CENTRAL ASIA. THE TALIBAN THEN AGREED TO ESCORT THE CONVOY ACROSS KANDAHAR, [REDACTED] NOTED. AS THE 30 PAKISTANI TRUCKS MOVED DOWN THE ROAD WITH THEIR TALIBAN ESCORT, [REDACTED] SAID THE RELIGIOUS STUDENTS BEGAN CUTTING THE CHAINS LAID ACROSS THE ROAD BY TOLL-HUNGRY COMMANDERS. "THERE WERE CHAINS ALMOST EVERY KILOMETER," [REDACTED] COMMENTED, "BUT THERE WAS NO INITIAL RESISTANCE TO OUR

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ACTIONS." HE SAID THAT AS WORD SPREAD OF WHAT THE TALIBAN WERE DOING, THE PEOPLE OF KANDAHAR BEGAN ACTIVELY TO SUPPORT THEM, BRINGING THE RELIGIOUS STUDENTS FOOD AND WEAPONS.

10. [REDACTED] SAID NO ONE WAS MORE SURPRISED THAN THE TALIBAN BY HOW QUICKLY THE MOVEMENT CAUGHT ON. WHEN FACED BY ARMED OPPOSITION BY SOME OF THE MORE POWERFUL COMMANDERS IN KANDAHAR, [REDACTED] COMMENTED THAT THE "MADRASA NETWORK" IN PAKISTAN'S NWFP AND BALUCHISTAN WAS ABLE TO PROVIDE WILLING RECRUITS IN A SHORT PERIOD OF TIME. MOST OF THE "THOUSANDS" OF AFGHANS (AND A FEW PAKISTANI PASHTUNS) WHO JOINED THE TALIBAN CAME FROM MADRASAS RUN BY THE PAKISTANIS [REDACTED] COMMENTED. TO ASSIST IN TRAINING THE TALIBAN AND OPERATING SOPHISTICATED WEAPONS (INCLUDING AIRCRAFT, TANKS AND HELICOPTERS) THE MOVEMENT HAD RECRUITED FORMER REGIME PILOTS AND GENERALS, WHO WERE BEING PAID TWICE THE USUAL SALARY OF 20,000 AFGHANIS A MONTH. THE TALIBAN THEMSELVES, HOWEVER, WERE VOLUNTEERS, [REDACTED] NOTED, WHO DEPENDED UPON SUPPORT FROM THE AFGHAN PEOPLE TO FEED THEMSELVES.

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FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD  
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INFO AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL  
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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: KISL, MOPS, SNAR, PINS, UN, SA, PK, AF

SUBJECT: FINALLY, A TALKATIVE TALIB: ORIGINS AND MEMBERSHIP  
- OF THE RELIGIOUS STUDENTS' MOVEMENT

STRUCTURE OF THE MOVEMENT  
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11. ASKED ABOUT THE STRUCTURE OF THE MOVEMENT, [REDACTED] SAID  
THERE IS A "HIGH COUNCIL" OF EIGHT AND A LOWER SHURA OF 22. B1, B6  
THE MEMBERS OF THE HIGH COUNCIL ARE: MOHAMMED OMAR, HAJI  
BASHAR, MOHAMMED HASSAN (GOVERNOR OF KANDAHAR), BAZ MOHAMMAD,  
AHMADULLAH, ABDUR-RAHMAN, QARI IHSANULLAH AND ABDUL-SALAM. THE  
FIRST THREE NAMES ARE THE MOST IMPORTANT, [REDACTED] OBSERVED,  
WITH MOHAMMED OMAR OCCASIONALLY CHANGING THE OTHER FIVE. ALL  
ARE MAULAVIS EXCEPT FOR HAJI BASHAR, AND ALL FOUGHT DURING THE  
JEHAD, HE NOTED. ALSO IMPORTANT IS THE TALIBAN MILITARY  
COMMANDER, MULLAH BORJAN, WHO IS DIRECTING THE MOVEMENT'S  
OPERATIONS AT KABUL. THE 22-MEMBER SHURA, OF WHICH [REDACTED]  
SAID HE WAS A MEMBER, DEALS WITH MORE ADMINISTRATIVE ISSUES  
THAN POLICY MATTERS AND ALL ITS MEMBERS ARE "FROM THE BOTTOM TO  
MIDDLE OF THE ULEMA."

12. THE TALIBAN'S IMMEDIATE AIM, [REDACTED] SAID, IS TO B1, B6  
DISARM ALL OF AFGHANISTAN AND ESTABLISH ONE MUSLIM GOVERNMENT  
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 FOR THE COUNTRY. ASKED ABOUT ELECTIONS, [REDACTED] SAID THE  
 TALIBAN BELIEVE IN ELECTIONS, BUT WOULD WANT TO WAIT UNTIL ALL  
 THE REFUGEES RETURN TO THE COUNTRY AND THERE WAS A MORE  
 PEACEFUL ATMOSPHERE. [REDACTED] SAID HE IMAGINED A  
 GOVERNMENTAL SET-UP IN WHICH THERE WOULD BE ONE NATIONAL SHURA  
 AND ALSO INDIVIDUAL PROVINCIAL SHURAS. HE SUGGESTED THAT THE  
 CURRENT TALIBAN SHURA WOULD DECIDE WHO COULD RUN IN THE  
 ELECTIONS. COMMENTING ON THE SUCCESS OF THE DISARMAMENT  
 CAMPAIGN IN KANDAHAR, [REDACTED] JOKED THAT WHEN HIS SON HAD  
 BEEN BORN A FEW DAYS PREVIOUSLY, THERE WERE NO GUNS IN THE  
 DISTRICT TO ANNOUNCE THE EVENT TO THE VILLAGE (TRADITIONALLY,  
 GUNS ARE FIRED INTO THE AIR TO SIGNAL THE BIRTH OF A SON).

B1, B6

NOT AGAINST THE SHI'A OR MINORITIES  
 -----

13. ASKED ABOUT CONCERNS THAT THE PASHTUN, SUNNI TALIBAN WOULD  
 NOT BE ACCEPTED BY THE SHI'A AND ETHNIC MINORITIES, [REDACTED]  
 SAID PASHTUNS ARE 70 PERCENT OF AFGHANISTAN'S POPULATION, BUT  
 THAT THE TALIBAN THOUGHT IT MORE IMPORTANT TO MAKE THE  
 MINORITIES HAPPY. HE CLAIMED THERE WAS A LARGE SHI'A  
 POPULATION IN THE TALIBAN-CONTROLLED PROVINCE OF ORUZGAN, AND  
 SAID THERE HAD BEEN NO PROBLEMS. "THE SHI'A ARE MUSLIMS, WE  
 HAVE LIVED WITH THEM FOR 200 YEARS," [REDACTED] DECLARED.  
 "THEY HAVE IMAM BARAS AND WE HAVE MOSQUES, BUT WE WILL NOT  
 INTERFERE WITH THEM," HE ADDED. THE SHI'A HIZB-I-WAHDAT PARTY  
 IN KABUL HAD BEGUN NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE TALIBAN, [REDACTED]  
 SAID, AND BOTH SIDES WERE PLEASED WITH THE DISCUSSIONS.

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14. ON THE ETHNIC ISSUE, [REDACTED] SAID THE TALIBAN WOULD DO  
 "TOO MUCH" TO KEEP THE MINORITIES HAPPY. "WE WILL MAKE AN  
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UZBEK GOVERNOR IN PATKIA AND A TAJIK GOVERNOR IN KANDAHAR, " HE  
COMMENTED, "ALL THIS TO KEEP THEM HAPPY." CITING THE EXAMPLE  
OF DOSTAM AND FEARS THAT THE COUNTRY COULD BE DIVIDED, THE  
[REDACTED] SAID DOSTAM WILL BE FREE TO PARTICIPATE IN THE  
POLITICAL PROCESS IN AFGHANISTAN, BUT MUST SURRENDER HIS  
WEAPONS AND ABIDE BY THE SHARIAH LAW. "EVERYONE WILL BE  
SUBJECT TO THE LAW," [REDACTED] NOTED.

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15. [REDACTED] SAID DOSTAM HAD RECENTLY SENT EMISSARIES TO  
THE TALIBAN, PROMISING TO SURRENDER ONCE "CERTAIN CONDITIONS"  
ARE MET. RABBANI HAD SENT SIMILAR MESSAGES, [REDACTED] NOTED,  
BUT MASOOD "WANTS TO FIGHT." IN KABUL, HARAKAT'S COMMANDER  
SIDDIQULLAH IS READY TO DEFECT TO THE TALIBAN, AND [REDACTED]  
SAID HE HAD ACCOMPANIED REPRESENTATIVES OF KHALIS, SAYYAF AND  
MOHEMMADI TO KANDAHAR WHERE THEY HAD PLEDGED TO SUPPORT THE  
MOVEMENT. ASKED ABOUT ISMAEL KHAN'S RELATIONS WITH THE  
TALIBAN, [REDACTED] SAID "ISMAEL KHAN IS A GOOD MAN, NOT THE  
BEST, BUT GOOD." KHAN IS READY TO SURRENDER TO THE TALIBAN,  
[REDACTED] JUDGED, AND COULD BE COUNTED ON TO OBEY THE  
MOVEMENT. ISMAEL KHAN'S COMMANDERS AROUND SHINDAND AIR BASE

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AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT  
USIA WASHDC 3139  
AMEMBASSY RIYADH  
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AMEMBASSY TASHKENT  
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK  
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AMCONSUL JEDDAH  
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USIA FOR NEA:OBEE

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AND IN HALF OF HERAT PROVINCE ALREADY HAD PLEDGED SUPPORT TO THE TALIBAN, HE NOTED.

COMMITMENT TO DRUG ERADICATION  
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16. RESPONDING TO A QUESTION CONCERNING THE TALIBAN'S COMMITMENT TO DRUG ERADICATION, [REDACTED] SAID HE COULD BEST DESCRIBE DEVELOPMENTS IN HIS HOME DISTRICT OF MAROOF. THERE, HE SAID, THE TALIBAN LEADER ABDUL-SAMAD HAD BEEN APPROACHED BY POPPY FARMERS AND ASKED WHETHER THEY COULD CONTINUE TO GROW THEIR CROP. ABDUL-SAMAD HAD CALLED TOGETHER 30 MEMBERS OF THE ULEMA, WHO ISSUED A PUBLIC STATEMENT OPPOSING THE GROWING AND TRADING OF NARCOTICS, AFTER WHICH THE FARMERS HAD BEEN TOLD THAT THEY WOULD BE PUNISHED UNDER THE SHARIAH IF THEY CONTINUED POPPY PRODUCTION. IN CONCLUSION, [REDACTED] OBSERVED THAT "THE TALIBAN BELIEVE NARCOTICS ARE BAD."

B1, B6

ATTITUDES TOWARDS OTHER COUNTRIES  
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17. SINCE HE EXPECTED TO HAVE A LEADERSHIP ROLE IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS ONCE THE TALIBAN SUCCEEDED IN REMOVING ALL THE COMMANDERS FROM AFGHANISTAN, [REDACTED] WAS EAGER TO TALK ABOUT THE TALIBAN'S ATTITUDES TOWARDS OTHER COUNTRIES. HE SAID THE MOVEMENT SOUGHT GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE ISLAMIC COUNTRIES, BUT DID NOT LIKE SAUDI ARABIA'S EFFORTS TO INTERFERE IN AFGHAN RELIGIOUS MATTERS. SIMILARLY, THE PAKISTAN GOVERNMENT'S DESIRE

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TO INTERFERE IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS, AND THE EFFORTS OF ISI TO TREAT AFGHANISTAN "LIKE ANOTHER PROVINCE" ARE NOT APPRECIATED, HE OBSERVED. SAYING THAT HE KNEW PERSONALLY [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] COMMENTED THAT "AFGHANS ARE PROUD PEOPLE WHO DO NOT LIKE THE PAKISTANIS ALWAYS TRYING TO RUN THINGS AND PLACE THE AFGHANS ON A LOWER LEVEL." THE TALIBAN WANT VERY GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE U.S., HE NOTED, PARTICULARLY SINCE THE U.S. HAD BEEN SO HELPFUL IN THE JEHAD. [REDACTED] SAID THAT THE TALIBAN REALIZE THAT THE U.S. AND THE U.N. DO NOT WANT TO DO ANYTHING BUT TO HELP THE AFGHANS.

18. ASKED TO COMMENT ON THE TALIBAN'S RELATIONS WITH THE U.N., [REDACTED] SAID THE BEST THING WOULD BE TO ARRANGE A MEETING WITH HAJI BASHAR AND MOHAMMED OMAR TO DISCUSS THE MATTER. HAJI BASHAR WOULD RETURN FROM PERFORMING UMRA FEBRUARY 26, AFTER WHICH A MEETING "IN SECRET" COULD BE ARRANGED. THE SECRECY WAS NECESSARY, HE SAID, BECAUSE OF EFFORTS BY THE ENEMIES OF THE TALIBAN TO PORTRAY THEM AS STOOGES OF OUTSIDE POWERS. "PEOPLE ARE SAYING BABAR, THE U.S. OR THE U.K. ARE BEHIND US," THE MAULAVI NOTED, "AND WE CANNOT DO ANYTHING WHICH MIGHT GIVE SUPPORT TO THIS VIEW." [REDACTED] PROMISED TO BE IN TOUCH THROUGH [REDACTED] ABOUT THE MEETING.

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19. AT THE CLOSE OF THE CONVERSATION, [REDACTED] RAISED THE TOPIC OF PASHTUNISTAN. [REDACTED] SAID THE DURAND ACCORD, LIKE THE LEASE OF HONG KONG, "WAS ABOUT TO EXPIRE." PAKISTAN HAD TRIED TO PRESSURE RABBANI INTO EXTENDING THE AGREEMENT, BUT HAD FAILED, [REDACTED] CLAIMED. [REDACTED] SAID THE ISSUE OF PASHTUNISTAN COULD BE ADDRESSED LATER, BUT NOTED THAT THE TALIBAN ARE NOW CAUGHT UP IN FIGHTING, TRYING TO BRING PEACE TO AFGHANISTAN.

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20. COMMENT: [REDACTED] APPEARED TO BE ABOUT [REDACTED] YEARS OLD, SPOKE A LITTLE ENGLISH, AND CLEARLY WAS WELL DISPOSED TOWARDS THE UNITED STATES. HIS IN-DEPTH KNOWLEDGE OF TALIBAN EVENTS AND PERSONALITIES LENDS CREDENCE TO HIS CLAIM TO BE ONE OF THE

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MOVEMENT'S INSIDERS. END COMMENT.

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