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**DEFSMAC - A COMMUNITY ASSET
(1964 - 1989)**

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AUTHOR.

DEFSMAC
963-5214s

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SUMMARY (U)

(TS) The Defense Special Missile and Astronautics Center (DEFSMAC) was established at Fort Meade, Maryland effective 1 June 1964, by the Department of Defense to provide a focal point for collection guidance and support for both SIGINT and non-SIGINT sensors engaged in obtaining information concerning foreign space and missile activity.¹ This was in contrast to the previous situation of unilateral, often fragmented, and uncorrelated individual reporting which the Intelligence Community recipient had to consolidate as best he could. DEFSMAC provides a Center for current reporting of intelligence to the Intelligence Community about foreign space and missile activity.

(TS) DEFSMAC is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) center established by Department of Defense (DOD) Directive 5100.43, dated 27 April 1964. DEFSMAC tasks and technically controls designated DOD missile and space intelligence collection and processing activities directed against foreign missile and space activities and provides current analysis and reporting of foreign missile and space events.²

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(S) DEFSMAC's mission is to accomplish 24 hour surveillance of foreign missile and space activities; alert and exercise technical control of DOD intelligence collection systems directed against foreign missile and space events; provide technical support, including tip-off, to all DOD missile and space intelligence collection activities to enable mission accomplishment; and, perform all source current analysis and reporting of all detected foreign missile and space events based on initial site reporting of all detected foreign missile and space events received up to 72 hours after the event.

(S) Since its establishment, DEFSMAC has been further tasked by DIA, NSA and higher authorities to provide intelligence information on strategic missile [redacted] directly to the White House Situation Room and National Military Command Center, timely intelligence flow to operational military commanders, support to [redacted] Program activities, assistance to the Departments of Defense and State in [redacted] activities, and participate in the Joint Chief of Staff (JCS) directed exercises and other activities.³

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I. Collection and Dissemination of Information to the
Intelligence Community (U) (prior to 1964)

A. Background (U)

(FOUO) Prior to the establishment of DEFSMAC, various organizations, such as the Army, Air Force, Navy, CIA, DIA and NSA attempted to task and support collection facilities independently and separately from like efforts by other collection facilities and agencies. The Intelligence Community was subject to collection program duplication, conflicting reporting, and frequent instances of [redacted] collection opportunities.⁴

(C) At the request of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Assistant Secretary of Defense and the Director of DIA jointly reviewed the missile and space intelligence programs of the DOD components during the period of 25 September 1963 through February 1964. The review disclosed that within the DOD, the DIA, NSA, the JCS, Unified and Specified Commands, the three Military

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Departments and certain military commands were engaged in missile and space intelligence activities. These organizations were supported by an extensive contractual effort. The analysis of the review indicated the need for a more efficient effort through improved management arrangements and procedures in the functional area. The analysis further reported that "with the exception of those Defense collection activities which operate(d) under the cognizance of the Director, NSA, the present management arrangements and procedures of Defense collection activities (did) not provide the supervision required to ensure adequate operational and technical performance."⁵ As a result of that review the DOD Directive was issued which established a joint NSA/DIA Department of Defense Special Missile and Astronautics Center (DOD/SMAC).

(U) Over the years the title DOD/SMAC was shortened in briefings and by references and was subsequently changed to DEF/SMAC and finally DEFSMAC in 1976, which is the title the Center is known by in the Intelligence Community today.⁶

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(S) DEFSMAC's functions were reaffirmed by the 1976 OASD (Comptroller) Auditor's report Number 644.⁷ This report emphasized the key role of the DEFSMAC centralized control of intelligence and current reporting of all foreign missile and space activity. The specific needs for which the National Intelligence and Military Operational community relies on DEFSMAC can be found in the current intelligence requirements and the Manual of Authorized Recipients of SIGINT Product (MARSP) which have been validated by the Defense Intelligence Agency for the DOD.

B. NSA (U)

(S) The National Security Agency (NSA) was established in 1958, to provide for the Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) mission of the United States, to establish an effective unified organization and control all SIGINT collection and processing activities of the United States, and to produce SIGINT in accordance with objectives, requirements and priorities established by the Central Intelligence with the advice of the United States Intelligence Board.⁸

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(T) The predecessor of DEFSMAC at NSA was the SIGINT Missile and Astronautics Center (SMAC). Plans for its establishment were drawn up in 1960-62. It was to function as the National Center for the rapid processing, in-house analysis and exchange of all missile and space data and related information from all SIGINT sources during periods of foreign missile and space operational activity. It was to be a Restricted SIGINT Operations Area.⁹

(FOUO) However as plans for the Center became finalized it became apparent that non-SIGINT information contributed much needed information to provide, on an immediate basis, comprehensive analytic reports pertaining to missile and space activity. At that time the NSA proposed to the DOD and DIA the formation of an all-source center, including non-SIGINT sources.¹⁰

C. DIA (U)

(U) The DIA was established in 1981 to assure a more efficient allocation of critical intelligence resources, more

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effective management of all DoD intelligence activities and the elimination of duplicating facilities and organizations. It was to be a focal point to exercise broad management review authority over military intelligence programs within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and to provide overall coordination of all foreign intelligence activities, conducted by various defense components.¹¹

D. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Air Force Technology Technical Division (FTD) (J)

~~(S)~~ CIA and FTD maintained their own watch operations center to monitor missile and space events. These centers reported on foreign [redacted]
[redacted]

II. General Description of DEFSMAC (J)

~~(S)~~ The DEFSMAC charter, signed in 1964, gave DEFSMAC the responsibility for 24 hour surveillance of foreign missile and space

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activities, tasking and technical control of all DOD intelligence collection activities directed against foreign and missile activities; providing technical support, including tip-off, to all DOD missile and space collection assets to assist them in the performance of their respective missions; and current analysis and reporting of foreign space and missile events based upon data collected by DoD missile and space intelligence activities received at DEFSMAC up to 72 hours after the event. DEFSMAC was to direct sensors on what to do and how to do assigned tasks.

(C) DEFSMAC does not have direct authority over the

[redacted] involved in missile and space intelligence collection. The DEFSMAC responsibilities are to provide coordinated NSA/CSS/DIA recommendations regarding when and [redacted] Authorities responsible for [redacted] act on these [redacted]

recommendations in accordance with JCS direction.

(U) The DIA management support and attendant authority concerning production of multidiscipline intelligence, and its

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contribution of non-cryptologic intelligence expertise, combined with the NSA/CSS SIGINT authority, presence, management support and cryptologic expertise, permit a much more detailed and comprehensive current management, analysis and reporting activity than could be achieved by either Agency individually.

(S) NSA and DIA missions and functions are complementary in nature and the DEFSMAC Joint Activity, as a result has come to be and is viewed as separate by NSA and DIA although supported and guided by both. This view is shared by the Military Departments, and the CIA. DEFSMAC enjoys direct management access to non-dedicated intelligence resources and other sensor systems managed by the military departments and the NSA/CSS. This in turn enables tasking and current planning to proceed in rapid response to [redacted] collection opportunities, uninhibited by non-operationally pertinent organizational considerations.

(S) CIA maintained a Foreign Missile and Space Activities Center (FMSAC), which worked closely with DEFSMAC for a number of

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years, and there was a CIA representative in DEFSMAC until June 1970. FMSAC was disbanded in 1974 leaving DEFSMAC as the only continuously operating center in the Washington area focused on the foreign missile and space problem for alerting, [redacted] collection related actions, and analysis and reporting. [redacted]

A. Organization Summary (U)

~~set~~ (FOUO) The director of DEFSMAC is always an NSA Senior Executive, he is assisted by a Deputy Director who is always a DIA Air Force colonel. These two positions are filled with the mutual agreement of the Directors of NSA and DIA. The DEFSMAC director is aided by an executive and operational staff. In 1987 a Senior Technological Advisor was added to DEFSMAC to assist in the future development of the organization. This Joint NSA/DIA operation is manned by [redacted] NSA personnel, [redacted] DIA personnel and [redacted]

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(S) DEFSMAC is organized into four directorates as depicted in Figure 1. The Operations element provides collection management to the collection system and maintains a 24 hour watch center that analyzes current activities and provides tip-off and support to a worldwide multifaceted collection system. The Intelligence element monitors and reports on current missile, space and [redacted] The Data System element provides automated data processing and external communications support to all of the above. The Science and Technology element advises the center regarding future requirements.

(S-600) Priorities and competition for SIGINT collection resources require selective coverage of communications that reflect activities relating to foreign missile and space events. When DEFSMAC detects or is advised of significant activities, appropriate collectors are advised immediately and their coverage is adjusted accordingly. Facilities tasked to collect data on foreign missile and space vehicles are not [redacted] to collect. [redacted]

[redacted] In order to achieve maximum collection, missile and [redacted]

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space collectors

~~(S)~~ DEFSMAC exploits information that is received on [redacted] and is received in the Center up to 72 hours after an event. At least two reports are normally issued on each missile event: a [redacted] report and a [redacted] type of report. The [redacted]

[redacted] The number of reports issued on a space event vary, depending on the type of event, the life of the vehicle involved and customer interest. [redacted] reports are always issued.

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
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Figure 1. DEFSMAC Organizational Chart (S)



B. Directorate Responsibilities Summary (U)

1. Operations Directorate (U)

(U) The Operations Directorate consists of the Resource Management Branch, the Specialized Daily Report and Analysis Branch, and the Operations Center. These branches are further divided into sections.

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a. The Resource Management Branch (U)

~~TTS-NF~~ Operational resources management is done by this branch. It is responsible for the coordination of [redacted] collection systems/sites, and the accomplishment of liaison and site support activities between DEFSMAC and collectors. These collectors range widely in volume, scope, and sophistication. They vary from



[redacted] SIGINT and MASINT (Measurement and Signature

Intelligence, [redacted]

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(S-TK) When DEFSMAC was established, [REDACTED] collections systems were not available to DEFSMAC. As [REDACTED] SIGINT collection systems grew in number and capability DEFSMAC's heavy dependence on these sensors led to the allocation of two of the collection management personnel to the [REDACTED] [REDACTED] and its predecessor organizations to manage [REDACTED] and other collection requirements and tasking. The [REDACTED] data which DEFSMAC began receiving [REDACTED] is an example of a [REDACTED] which provides [REDACTED] of DEFSMAC targets, both [REDACTED] [REDACTED] This arrangement continues today.

b. The Operations Center Branch (U)

~~SECRET~~ The DEFSMAC Operations Center Branch is manned 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, maintaining a continuous, [REDACTED] surveillance of [REDACTED] foreign missile and space activities. This center receives a [REDACTED] of information related to foreign missile and space activities. Some of the information is in the form of (1) [REDACTED] analysis of a missile [REDACTED]

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from one of the S&T centers, including the CIA; (2) an electrical message from a SIGINT site noting that certain [redacted]

[redacted] (3) a one line KLEIGHLIGHT
(Electrical SIGINT Report); [redacted] or (4) a [redacted]

[redacted] DEFSMAC's operations officers have been in the foreground in [redacted]
[redacted] missile and space operations. They observe and note the [redacted]

[redacted] These [redacted] are used to document the activity that takes place [redacted]

[redacted] They provide 24 hour [redacted] analysis and an evaluation of all applicable SIGINT and MASINT data reported from a worldwide network of sensors and field stations. They provide tip-off, alerting and technical control and guidance of [redacted] collection resources; and

[redacted] preliminary reporting on events. This division is manned by four watch teams, each consisting of a Mission Director and [redacted]

personnel.

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c. The Specialized Daily Reporting and Analysis

Branch (U)

~~(S)~~ The Specialized Daily Reporting and Analysis

Branch is functionally divided into the [redacted] Reporting Section and the [redacted] Processing and [redacted] Sections. The branch issues [redacted] periodic, and mission [redacted] event reports, prepares [redacted] inputs to special studies on [redacted] identifies [redacted] processes and catalogs all [redacted] and missile [redacted] reports, provides quality control and processing of [redacted] data for NSA and DEFSMAC, produces and forwards [redacted] to [redacted] [redacted] sites to support SIGINT collection actions, and produces formatted [redacted] reports for NSA and DEFSMAC analyst use. This branch is also the focal point for data base entry of all field site [redacted] reports for the S&T Intelligence Community, and is presently being tasked with [redacted]

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2. The Intelligence Directorate (U)

(S) This is the Intelligence Reporting element which is divided into the Missile, Space [redacted] Branches that provide analysis and product reporting and the [redacted] [redacted] which does [redacted] and reporting of [redacted]

(S) This division accomplishes all source analysis, evaluates site reporting and produces end product reports for the consumers. Its responsibilities include supervision of all intelligence reporting by DEFSMAC and accomplishment of end product all source analysis and assessment reporting of foreign missile and space events based on field site reports. The division also provides feedback to U.S. [redacted] collectors, and provides the primary interface with consumers. Intelligence Division personnel maintain a comprehensive understanding of worldwide missile and space programs and provide authoritative information to DEFSMAC's many consumers in response to frequent requests. Division

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personnel also maintain a complete, all source data base on foreign missile and space events which is unique and is heavily relied upon throughout the community. This data base is the reference by which NSA catalogs the [redacted] collection.

[redacted] (S)

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(S-800) In response to Science and Technology (S&T) Intelligence Community needs, the [redacted]

[redacted] was established in 1981.13&14 This center is manned with personnel from NSA elements from the [redacted] and an element from the Space and Missile Signals Analysis and Search Group (A64 and W14). It functions under the operational control of the Intelligence Space Branch, providing a 24 hour per day coverage of [redacted] activity. These analysts assist DEFSMAC current reporting functions and accomplish long term analysis work. [redacted] provides timely reporting of [redacted] activities and isolates key data to facilitate their analytic efforts. The formation of [redacted] benefited NSA, DIA, DEFSMAC and

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other DOD consumers by centralizing [redacted] analytic and reporting efforts and facilitating collection coordination activities.

TSL Requirements for other [redacted]
countries missile and space activity may lead to further arrangements with other NSA elements.

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3. The Data Systems Directorate (U)

(U) The Data Systems Directorate provides the necessary automated data processing capabilities for DEFSMAC's unique programs and maintains external communications and ADP program compatibility. It is responsible for hardware, software, and communications support. The directorate consists of three branches, the Multisystem, Operations and Program Support Branches. The directorate is presently involved in converting its data processing from older systems into new more modern systems.

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4. The Science and Technology Division (U)

(TREQ) This division serves as a focal point for defining future Center requirements. Its functions include the NSA representative to the MASINT Committee, the development of requirements for improved collection, processing, analysis and reporting techniques, and includes development of [redacted]
[redacted] for the Intelligence Community.

(TEQO) From its inception in 1964 DEFSMAC had gradually outgrown both its space and equipment. A major modernization was begun in 1977 and in 1983 the Director of NSA, Lt Gen Lincoln D. Faure, USAF, and the Director DIA, LTG James A. Williams, USA, inaugurated its operations on 14 March 1983. This modernization effort is continuing today as DEFSMAC's tasks continue to grow with the increased requirements from the Intelligence Community.

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III. Evolution of Responsibilities (U)

~~(S)~~ Since DEFSMAC's formation, its responsibilities have steadily grown to meet the significantly increased numbers of foreign missile and space events, more technologically complex systems [redacted]

[redacted] increasing complex and diverse collection systems, and the growing needs of an ever expanding number of consumers throughout the operations and intelligence communities. DEFSMAC presently functions as a national level intelligence operations center for coordinating and alerting multidiscipline [redacted]

[redacted] intelligence collection and surveillance systems.

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A. Targets (U)

~~(S)~~ DEFSMAC's primary mission was originally against [redacted] space and missile systems. However with the [redacted] emerging

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missile and space capability, DEFSMAC's mission has vastly expanded. Approximately [redacted] missile and space [redacted] took place

[redacted]
the
[redacted]
[redacted]

(S)

[redacted]

5. [redacted] (S)

(S) The missile and space activity [redacted]

[redacted] DEFSMAC requested support from [redacted]

[redacted] to help with sensor alerting and the current [redacted] missile and space activity. This group assigned [redacted] personnel to the Center to be used for this purpose. This arrangement continues today.

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
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C. Resources (U)

(S) DEFSMAC maintains a round-the-clock effort reviewing the intelligence information obtained from various resources including SIGINT sites [redacted]

[redacted]
assets; collection resources of [redacted] as well as other, more sophisticated, national collection resources which provide valuable input to the mission. This demanding task of monitoring and tasking of collection for [redacted]

[redacted] plus the technical complexity of numerous collection assets, presents a challenging and evergrowing intelligence issue.

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D. [redacted] (U)

(S-PK) DEFSMAC did not receive [redacted] information

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[redacted] on a routine basis [redacted] At that time DEFSMAC began receiving [redacted] -- These systems used [redacted] by the Air Force for analysis and then forwarded to DEFSMAC. This [redacted] was not current enough to support DEFSMAC's collection planning mission. However [redacted]

[redacted] As the [redacted] progressed to daily support. and the data multiplied there was a growing need for interactive tip-off [redacted] and SIGINT systems which necessitated the creation of the [redacted] within the Intelligence Division in DEFSMAC. This branch prepares and forward requirements, disseminates results, and administratively supports [redacted] product flow. Today through the DEFSMAC's contact with the [redacted] we can request [redacted]

[redacted] on a real time basis. This support aids the Intelligence Community in its recognition of [redacted]

[redacted] brought more details regarding the missile and space activity into DEFSMAC.¹⁵

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E. [REDACTED] Sensor Event Reporting -(S)

(S) In response to requirements from operational military forces (U.S. CINCPAC, U.S. CINCSPACE, and other commands) DEFSMAC provides [REDACTED] reporting called [REDACTED] on foreign [REDACTED] events to [REDACTED] [REDACTED] and other sensitive operations. The requirements for reporting the activity have grown considerably since 1981 to include 24 hour per day [REDACTED] support (when requested) and daily sensor event reports. The Specialized Daily Reporting and Analysis Section was formed to handle this requirement in 1981. 16 [REDACTED]

F.

[REDACTED] (U)

TS) The [REDACTED] into the [REDACTED]

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[redacted]
is declared at this time. This
is a major JCS directed operation involving [redacted] of Air
Force and Navy [redacted]. DEFSMAC provides
initial assessment and recommendation for implementation of [redacted]
[redacted] operations and provides extensive technical control for all
sensor [redacted] DEFSMAC personnel [redacted]
[redacted] operations to serve as liaison [redacted]
controllers. [redacted] operations have increased in complexity.
as new [redacted] have been deployed and the [redacted] have begun
to modify [redacted]
[redacted]

G. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Exercises (U)

(U) DEFSMAC has been tasked with providing support to
JCS exercises; is required to write scripts for the exercises and
also be a daily participant in the realtime activity.¹⁷

- (b) (1)
- (b) (3)-50 USC 403
- (b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

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H.

(U)

(S) DEFSMAC also provides extensive current intelligence to authorities monitoring [] activities associated with [] DEFSMAC is required to support this task by supplying information on the [] missiles []

I. U.S. Space Command (USSPACECOM) Requirements (U)

(S-CCO) In response to the formation of the USSPACECOM in September 1985, DEFSMAC and USSPACECOM reviewed the need for expanded [] intelligence flow on []

improve coordination of space intelligence analysis and reporting

- (b) (1)
- (b) (3)-50 USC 403
- (b) (3)-18 USC 798
- (b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

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activities, enhance coordination with Command MASINT sensors, and assist development of analytic capabilities.¹⁸ A plan, entitled [redacted] was developed to enable collection, processing and reporting of [redacted] and national level consumer requirements.

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

J. [redacted]

(U)

(c)(1)

from foreign missile and space activity through [redacted]

DEFSMAC provided informal

reporting on this intelligence information to the military commanders and authorized consumers until March 1989. At that time DEFSMAC began issuing formal reports called [redacted] in response to the increased demand for this information. The [redacted] plan envisions both near and mid term actions to accomplish the tasks.

(b) (1)

(b) (3)-50 USC 403

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

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IV. IMPROVEMENTS IN COLLECTION STRATEGIES (U)

(U) The operation of new collection systems has steadily increased the very large volume of data that is forwarded to the operations center. DEFSMAC is indebted to its customers and collectors for improvements made in collecting information. Timely analysis of large volumes of data collected by national collection resources remains a difficult operational challenge.

~~(S)~~ The increasing difficulty and complexity of problems caused by [redacted] testing, and the increasingly sophisticated target environments have delayed the analysts in the production of timely, accurate, and complete intelligence reports. Expert systems developed by the Research and Engineering Organization of NSA and other Intelligence Community members have significantly increased accuracy and handle a larger volume of data than the traditional software could manage.

(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

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(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

V. COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS (U)

~~(C)~~ From its inception DEFSMAC has used point-to-point communications systems, however in the early days of operation, collection sites normally transmitted information via the [redacted] system. This system was not active 24 hours a day. When suspected [redacted] activity began, the system had to be activated before a report could be made, thus delaying the reporting of activity. Today the [redacted] circuits remain open and ready for transmissions 24 hours a day.

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

~~(C)~~ ~~(D)~~ Numerous types of communications systems, including satellite, and computer assisted relays and programs are available to the Intelligence Community today. DEFSMAC through the use of various strategies, one of which is new high speed communications [redacted]

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(S) The nature of the tasked targets has become increasingly more complex and diverse. Accomplishment of timely, responsive direction for optimum collection against targets became and remains difficult. DEFSMAC organized an in-house data systems support element in 1970 to provide the quick action, unique and tailored computer support required by the center. Some of the systems used are: (1) [REDACTED] - this is an [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] system. This system reduced the time an analyst spent

[REDACTED] (2) [REDACTED] - this is the data handling system that places all entries into the [REDACTED] the data base for all foreign space and missile [REDACTED] (3) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (4) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] and (5) SMACPOST - an

[REDACTED] software package for IBM terminals. This support element has interfaced the DEFSMAC systems with the [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] and the National SIGINT Operational Center (NSOC) and maintains DEFSMAC's extensive specialized software systems.

(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

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A. TIP-OFF SUPPORT (U)

(T-SCO) DEFSMAC and the NSA Office of Space and Missiles (W1) began work in 1984, on an expert system called [REDACTED] is an effort to develop an automated, integrated, interactive, state-of-the-art tip-off support system to assist the DEFSMAC Operations Center Mission Director in determining the likelihood of foreign missile/space operations. This system will be capable of receiving all-source intelligence, scan the incoming data for pertinent tip-off information such as [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The system would then pass the information on to a symbolics terminal for the DEFSMAC Mission Director's review.¹⁹

[REDACTED]
(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

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(b) (1)
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

B. COMMUNICATIONS SUPPORT (U)

(S) DEFSMAC's communications connectivity is provided through [redacted] telephone, press, [redacted] and computer link (shared with NSOC) to the NSA [redacted] and other systems.

(U//FOUO) TBS

[redacted]
[redacted]

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

(U//FOUO)

(DX)

(U//FOUO) TBS


Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals

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Figure 4. DEFSMAC [REDACTED] CIRCUITS (S-CCO)

(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36



* Indicates on call circuit, not active 24 hours per day

** [REDACTED]

*** When deployed

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(C) Voice - Telephone links to DEFSMAC include [redacted]

[redacted] and commercial access. Additionally, [redacted]

[redacted] are provided by NSA to support

[redacted] DEFSMAC personnel during [redacted]

In

addition to this system, there is a [redacted]

(TS-TK)

[redacted]
(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

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ADP Support - Data processing support is provided primarily through access to the [] a computer complex which provides communications handling and data processing support to time sensitive customers at NSA. Within DEFSMAC spaces, approximately [] user workstations (both stand alone and linked to the [] and other major computer complexes) are available to users for various applications. Some of the data handling systems currently being developed and interfaced with DEFSMAC systems are the [] system, the [] a [] system, and the Database Integration system.

(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

C. Communications Patch Panel (U)

When DEFSMAC was established, the communications system had been able to handle the volume of data it received and transmitted. Over the years as more consumers and contacts were added new circuits were patched into the system as required. As the communications panel became overloaded, outages occurred and lack of

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adequate lines to handle the increased volume became difficult to establish. When [redacted] either a missile or space vehicle is [redacted]

[redacted] Several of

DEFSMAC's contacts and customers have only single communications channels and the loss of DEFSMAC's terminal meant no contact with that site. The need for an immediate and continual link with DEFSMAC's sites became critical. By 1986 the DEFSMAC Operations Center needed to replace the outdated [redacted] circuit [redacted] patch panel with a new, more capable version. Plans were drafted and in 1988 a request for an ADC 4-23336-0020 Patch Panel was forwarded through NSA. This panel was needed to handle critical requirements for immediate access to all of the consumers, and to alert several classes of collectors and users, via [redacted]

[redacted] space and missile [redacted] 20 Work on the patch panel was begun in 1988 and the new Circuit Patch Panel became operational in June 1989.

(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

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VI. PLANS FOR THE FUTURE (U)

A. [redacted] (U)

~~(S=ECO)~~ DEFSMAC announced plans to begin [redacted]

[redacted] limited reporting of [redacted]

[redacted] data in 1989. DIA was requested to begin defining potential customers for this reporting.²¹ While this initiative is in response to recent changes in [redacted] NSRLS by U.S. Space Command, some of which have been validated by SIRVES, this planning is addressing a broad range of reporting requirements intended to improve [redacted] SIGINT reporting on foreign [redacted] missile and space operations.²²

~~(S)~~ The implementation of this [redacted] program will build on the existing space collection and missile S&T collection system by establishing the necessary time sensitive processing.

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analysis and reporting mechanisms. Plans have been developed to upgrade field collection, processing and establish automated [redacted]
[redacted] reporting from DEFSMAC.

(e-eeo) DEFSMAC reporting, will be expanded to include [redacted]

[redacted] This will be accomplished by establishing a DEFSMAC Space Operations Center in FY1990 to provide the necessary time sensitive analysis and reporting for the space threat. As part of the [redacted] program, DEFSMAC changed its reporting of [redacted]

[redacted] and/or telephonic support to such customers as U.S. Space Command/NORAD and the NMCC for all [redacted] Missile and Space [redacted] A formal TACREP reporting system was instituted on 1 March 1989, thus making it possible to expand TACREP availability to operational military and intelligence community customers with legitimate time sensitive/24 hour per day reporting requirements.

(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-18 USC 798
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

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B. MASINT (U)

(e) [] MASINT sensors are being developed and existing sensors enhanced. The complexity of collection and analysis will continue to increase, and DEFSMAC will be required to expand reporting on these sensors.

C. NEW COLLECTION RESOURCES (U)

(f) New systems, such as [] and [] will further expand center responsibilities for sensor tip-off, collection coordination, and []

1. (f)(1)

DEFSMAC is required to provide support by a Daily []

(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
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2. (TS) [Redacted]

3. (TS) [Redacted]

D. [Redacted] (C) [Redacted]

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

TC → [Redacted] is an NSA initiative to relocate the essential operating elements of NSOC, OCMC and DEFSMAC to a common area. These are the three time-sensitive operations centers at NSA. The objective is to facilitate consolidation and establish common capabilities which could include: communications and systems management, crisis management and conferencing, administration, logistics, and visitor control. The relocation is planned to begin in the 1992-1993 timeframe.

(b) (1)

(b) (3)-50 USC 403

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

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VII. CONCLUSION (U)

(c) DEFSMAC fulfills a unique role with the DoD Community through its timely sensor alerting, collection coordination, technical assistance, and [redacted] analysis and reporting. DEFSMAC personnel apply their expertise to accomplish all source initial analyses which frequently are the only assessments disseminated for the [redacted] on many foreign missile and space events. These assessments single out particularly significant events to enable the S&T intelligence centers to focus on items of immediate interest rather than sorting through [redacted]

[redacted] Responsibilities are accomplished through a 24 hour operation center, a worldwide operational communications network, a multisource collection alerting and coordination effort, analytic and technical data base resources, and an analytic force with exceptional experience and continuity on missile and space activity.

(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

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(C) DEFSMAC has functioned as a joint, interagency center for the past twenty-five years. With the exception of the [redacted] [redacted] it has handled the growth in [redacted] numbers, the corresponding growth in the collected data, the growth in the volume and complexity of targets, collection management, data processing, analysis and the production of current intelligence, in both formal product and informal support actions with virtually the same level of manning that it had in 1964. Many of the analysts have been with the center, or been involved in the missile and space activity since that time. Its responsibilities have steadily grown to meet the significantly increased need of the Intelligence Community. DEFSMAC now functions as a national level intelligence operation center for coordinating and alerting multidiscipline [redacted] intelligence collection and [redacted]

surveillance systems.

(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

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ENDNOTES

1 [redacted] Defense Special Missile and Astronautics Center (S), DOD Directive Number S-5100.43, 27 April 1964.

2 Gordon A. Blake, Lt Gen, USAF and Joseph F. Carroll, Lt Gen, USAF. Memorandum of Understanding Between the Defense Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency (S), 29 May 1964.

3 [redacted] DEFSMAC 2000 (TS-TK), Part I, TCS-53705-89, June 1989.

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5 Eugence G. Fubini, and Joseph F. Carroll Lt Gen, USAF, Department of Defense Review of Missile and Space Intelligence Programs of DoD Components (TSC), 20 February 1964, p. 2.

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8 Henry A. Kissinger, Signals Intelligence (TS-EC), NSCID 6, BYE-034-72, 17 February 1972 (Superseded NSCID No. 6, dated 15 September 1958, revised 18 January 1961).

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(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-18 USC 798
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

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13 Richard Bernard, DEFSMAC Highlights (TSC-TK), DEFSMAC 113-80, September 1980.

15 [redacted] personal interview (TSC-TK), 6 December 1988.

16 Richard Bernard, DEFSMAC Highlights (TCS), NSA-TCS-57968-82, 10 March 1982.

17 [redacted] DEFSMAC Highlights (TSC-TK), TCS-53747-89, 27 April 1989.

18 [redacted] and [redacted] Brig Gen, USAF, Administrative Agreement [redacted] and Director, DEFSMAC (C), May 1987.

19 [redacted] "Inputs to Proposals for FY 1992-1997 Program Build for [redacted] (TSC-TK)", Memorandum, W11-153-89, 25 July 1989.

20 [redacted] Communications Terminal Maintenance (S), Memorandum, DEFSMAC-018-88, 26 January 1988.

21 [redacted] "Space [redacted] (TSC)", DEFSMAC-221-89, 072258Z February 1989.

[redacted] (b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-18 USC 798
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-18 USC 798
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ANNEX A

DIRECTORS OF DEFSMAC

Charles Tevis 1964 - 1967

[redacted] 1967 - 1974

Gordon Stark 1974 - 1978

James Pryde 1978 - 1980

Richard Bernard 1980 - 1983

[redacted] 1983 - 1986

1986 - [redacted] 1990

1990 - 1992

1992 - "PRESENT" → (Dec. 1993)
[redacted]

(b) (3)-D.L. 86-36

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